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It is natural to think of our mind as being located in our head. When we think a thought or
feel an emotion—including a religious thought or emotion—it feels like these mental states
arise inside the private mental space of our own consciousness. This feeling is strengthened
by the observation that we can (and often do) think and feel something without anyone else
knowing about it. But we know—immediately and directly—our own thoughts and
feelings. And we know these things in a different way than we do, say, the contents of our
refrigerator or what’s happening with the Tokyo Stock Exchange. To get that information,
we must direct our attention outward to the external world and take various steps to acquire
it. But to know our own mental states, all we need to do is turn our attention inward. This
is because we enjoy what philosophers call privileged access to an internal first-person
perspective on our mental life.
These considerations seem to support the idea that the mind is entirely in the head.
But not all philosophers and cognitive scientists accept this idea. Some of them argue that
to understand the nature of the mind, we need to investigate how we use various artifacts
and technologies to support and enhance our thinking. This is because these artifacts and
technologies don’t simply help us think (although they clearly do); rather, they actually
are part of our thinking. In other words, these thinkers argue that parts of the world—
including parts that support religious thought and experience—can quite literally become
parts of our mind. From this perspective, the mind isn’t something that’s just in our head.
At times, it extends into the world via these thought-enhancing artifacts and
technologies. This is the basic idea behind a philosophical view called the extended
mind thesis.
Philosophers and cognitive scientists have, in recent years, debated the plausibility of
the extended mind thesis, growing an immense body of literature. Yet despite its many
supporters, relatively few attempts have been made to apply the thesis to religious studies,
particularly studies of religious cognition. In what follows, I indicate how various
dimensions of religious cognition might be thought of as extended. In particular, I focus on
the mutually supporting relationship between religious cognition and material culture: the
many things we use to organize and enact our religious practices and beliefs, from relics and
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rituals to songs and holy spaces. As we’ll see, taking the extended mind thesis seriously
suggests that an investigation of religious material culture is, simultaneously, an
investigation of religious cognition.
The discussion proceeds in three sections: first, I introduce the idea of embodied
cognition and show how this increasingly influential approach sets the scene for the
extended mind thesis. Next, I look in more detail at the extended mind thesis as developed
by the philosophers Andy Clark (1957–) and David Chalmers (1966–), focusing on their
famous thought experiment involving memory. I then consider how the extended mind
thesis might productively inform investigations of three themes: religious cognition,
religious emotions, and personal identity. Along the way, I canvass philosophical discussions
as well as different streams of empirical literature to construct ways of thinking about the
extended religious mind.
FROM THE EMBODIED TO THE EXTENDED MIND
SETTING THE SCENE: EMBODIED APPROACHES TO COGNITION
Within philosophy of mind and cognitive science, embodiment is currently a central theme in
a family of views that fall under the label embodied cognition (for overviews of embodied
cognition, see Shaun Gallagher’s How the Body Shapes the Mind [2005], Raymond Gibbs’s
Embodiment and Cognitive Science [2005], and The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition
[2014], edited by Lawrence Shapiro). From an embodied perspective, distinctively human
forms of thought, perception, and emotion are shaped by both the sorts of bodies we have
(their physiology and morphology) as well as by the things they can do (their capacity for
movement, action, and ability to use and incorporate various tools). Embodied cognition
theorists reject models that conceive of the mind as entirely in the head. They argue instead
that mind emerges within, and is at times even constituted by, patterns of world-involving
action.
In addition to philosophical discussions, various lines of empirical evidence support
this connection between mind and embodied action. For example, studies such as Hearing
Gesture (2003) by Susan Goldin-Meadow and Gesture and Thought (2005) by George
McNeill indicate an apparent link between gesture, thought, and language processing. So-
called enactive approaches to perception, developed in J. Kevin O’Regan’s Why Red
Doesn’t Sound like a Bell (2011) and Alva Noë’s Action in Perception (2004), argue that
perceptual consciousness is constituted by the ongoing exercise of sensorimotor skills. In
the realm of emotions, many studies—such as those discussed in James D. Laird’s Feelings:
The Perception of Self (2007), Michelle Maiese’s Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition
(2011), and Paula M. Niedenthal’s “Embodying Emotion” (2007)—suggest that feeling,
perceiving, thinking, and even speaking about emotions depends upon feedback from
somatovisceral and motoric processes. In the domain of social cognition, research on
mirror neurons, discussed in Giacomo Rizzolatti and Corrado Sinigaglia’s Mirrors in the
Brain (2008), suggests that visuomotor neurons fire both when an agent performs an
action as well as when they observe someone else doing it. These lines of evidence support
the idea that the body-beyond-the-brain shapes both the form and content of our mental
life.
But our bodies are not fixed entities limited by their biology. Bodies are plastic, open to
various forms of functional augmentation and enhancement. One way to bring out the
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plastic character of embodiment is to look at how we routinely incorporate and merge with
everyday items of our material culture, such as tools and technologies. These body-world
incorporations are instructive. They indicate how material augmentations change not only
the physical structure and functional capacities of our bodies, but also the phenomenology of
our embodiment—that is, the way we experience our bodies as well as the way the world is
disclosed to us via this bodily experience.
Consider picking up a cane and using it to probe our environment. After a few
moments of practice, the cane is no longer experienced as an object that we hold, something
distinct from us and our agency. Rather, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) famously
observed, the cane disappears, experientially speaking (Merleau-Ponty 1945); it becomes the
transparent vehicle through which we perceptually access the world. And within this process,
we experience a reconfiguration of our local sense of embodiment. When we skillfully use
the cane to explore our world, we experience our body, as well as its attendant sensorimotor
capacities, as extending into and through the cane. Additionally, we experience an expanded
set of action-possibilities that flow from this altered sense of embodiment. The world shows
up for us in a different way, as inviting interactions that weren’t there before we picked up
the cane. We can now reach, poke, probe, and manipulate previously inaccessible parts of
our environment.
Empirical work supports the idea that our body and its capacities are open to material
augmentation and extension. A striking example is Paul Bach-y-Rita’s (1934–2006) work
on sensory substitution and his technology known as tactile visual sensory substitution
system (TVSS), initially designed to bring vision to blind subjects (see, for example,
Bach-y-Rita, Mitchell E. Tyler, and Kurt A. Kaczmarek’s “Seeing with the Brain” [2003]).
TVSS is a prosthetic visual technology that relies on the body’s ability to map information
from one perceptual modality (e.g., sight) to another (e.g., touch). It operates by
translating visual information from the environment, which enters through a head-
mounted camera, into patterns of vibrations conveyed via stimulators in contact with the
skin of the wearer’s abdomen, back, thigh, or tongue. As blind subjects adjust to the
experience of wearing TVSS while moving around their environment, they report quasi-
visual experiences of three-dimensional objects—a kind of technologically augmented
tactile vision. Moreover, the technology quickly becomes experientially transparent.
The wearer no longer experiences the technology as an object but rather as something
that has been integrated into her body and that now helps perceptually disclose the world
in a new way.
We find similar examples of this phenomenon in everyday life: we wear glasses to
improve vision, hearing aids to enhance auditory perception, braces to stabilize unsteady
joints and enhance balance, and electric wheelchairs to provide mobility. Over time, these
technologies disappear, experientially speaking, as we become comfortable using them and
with the new ways of perceiving and acting they make possible. Likewise, skilled athletes
and musicians routinely merge with their baseball bats and bagpipes, golf clubs and guitars,
and in so doing experience an expanded sense of embodiment: they live through these
technologies and artifacts onto the world and feel their bodies to have expanded both
spatially (by integrating with these artifacts) and functionally (in terms of the new things
they can do). Observations like these have led theorists to argue that we are profoundly
embodied agents, “creatures for whom body, sensing, world, and technology are resources
apt for recruitment in ways that yield a permeable and repeatedly reconfigurable agent/
world boundary” (Clark 2007, 279).
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TAKING THE NEXT STEP: THE EMBODIED MIND, EXTENDED
Thinking of embodiment as reconfigurable in this way can lead to another more radical
thesis. This is the extended mind thesis (ExM). This expression was first proposed by Clark
and Chalmers in their 1998 article, “The Extended Mind” (see also Richard Menary’s The
Extended Mind (2010) for an introduction to various debates surrounding ExM). According
to ExM, the physical machinery making up the mind is not necessarily confined to the head.
Some mental states and processes are partially constituted by external resources—including
items of our material culture—that lie beyond the boundaries of skin and skull. In other
words, minds are (at least potentially) composed of biological and nonbiological parts.
ExM is not a brand new thesis. We find versions of this idea in pragmatist philosophers
like William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859–1952), as well as phenomen-
ologists like Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Merleau-Ponty. For example, Dewey
insists that “thinking, or knowledge-getting, is far from being the armchair thing that it is
often supposed to be. The reason it is not an armchair thing is that it is not an event going
on exclusively within the cortex.… Hands and feet, apparatus and appliances of all kinds are
as much a part of it as changes in the brain” (Dewey 1916, 13–14). These philosophers were
sensitive to the ways that the kinds of thought we’re capable of depend essentially on the
things we use to think. These things can include both our bodies (e.g., using our fingers to
count) as well as artifacts and technologies (e.g., counting with an abacus or calculator).
Contemporary defenders of ExM have incorporated these insights into their own
thinking while developing a number of new arguments. The locus classicus of current
discussions of ExM is Clark and Chalmers’s “The Extended Mind” (1998). Clark and
Chalmers motivate ExM with a thought experiment involving two characters, Otto and
Inga. Otto suffers from memory loss brought on by a mild form of Alzheimer’s disease. To
cope, he carries a notebook with him wherever he goes. Whenever Otto picks up new
information, he records it in this notebook. When he needs it—for example, when he wants
to remember the location of Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York so he can go
see a new art exhibition he’s heard about—Otto simply consults his trusty notebook,
retrieves the information, and acts on it. Inga, on the other hand, doesn’t have Alzheimer’s.
She can use her biological memory in a way Otto cannot. When Inga hears about the same
exhibition and decides to go see it, she pauses for a moment, consults her bio-memory to
remember MoMA’s location, and sets off.
According to Clark and Chalmers, Otto’s use of his notebook is a case of extended
cognition. Some of Otto’s memories and dispositional beliefs—such as his belief that
MoMA is on 53rd Street—are housed outside of his head in his notebook. Importantly, the
information in Otto’s notebook is poised to play the same role that Inga’s brain-bound
information plays in supporting her beliefs and guiding her behavior. The only difference
between these two cases, according to Clark and Chalmers, is that some of Otto’s beliefs
lie beyond his skin (i.e., encoded in his notebook), whereas Inga’s beliefs are in her head
(i.e., encoded in bits of her brain). From a functionalist perspective, which Clark and
Chalmers endorse, it is mere prejudice to insist that only Inga’s internal brain-bound beliefs
are genuinely cognitive, whereas Otto’s notebook-bound beliefs are not. For, when we look
carefully at how these internal and external processes work, respectively, as well as what they
enable each thinker to do, we see that their overall profile is identical. As Clark and
Chalmers put it, there is functional parity between them—even if their physical constitution
clearly differs. And for Clark and Chalmers, then, functional parity is ultimately sufficient
for mentality. External elements can sometimes be part of our minds.
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ExM has generated much debate in recent years (for important book-length critiques of
ExM, see Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa’s The Bounds of Cognition [2008] and Robert
Rupert’s Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind [2009]). But we don’t have to rely on
thought experiments to make this idea plausible. Consider the many ways we routinely off-
load cognitive states and functions onto the environment. We off-load memories, for
instance, onto artifacts and material structures in our environment: smartphones and
portable calendars help us recall appointments and phone numbers; sticking a note on the
side of a computer monitor or by the door prompts memory of to-do items; as Shaun
Gallagher notes in “The Socially Extended Mind” (2013), even social and cultural practices
and institutions (political structures, religious rituals, legal systems) play a cognitive role by
encoding the complex web of historical narratives, memories, beliefs, and procedural
knowledge collectively learned over many generations. From the perspective of ExM,
interacting with these external resources augments and extends our brain-bound biological
capacities. Users link up and integrate with these external resources in an ongoing, mutually
influencing way that ultimately leads to the emergence of an extended (i.e., user-artifact)
cognitive system.
Clark and Chalmers originally argued that ExM includes non-conscious cognitive
states, such as Otto’s dispositional beliefs about MoMA, but not necessarily conscious
mental states, such as perceptual experiences or emotions. But recently, theorists have
moved beyond this limitation and expanded ExM discussions to consider a variety of topics,
including perceptual consciousness, as in Dave Ward’s “Enjoying the Spread” (2012); music
cognition, as in Joel Krueger’s “Affordances and the Musically Extended Mind” (2014a) and
Tom Cochrane’s “Expression and Extended Cognition” (2008); social cognition, as in
Gallagher and Anthony Crisafi’s “Mental Institutions” (2009), Krueger’s “Extended
Cognition and the Space of Social Interaction” (2011b), and Georg Theiner, Colin Allen,
and Robert L. Goldstone’s “Recognizing Group Cognition” (2010); and emotion research,
as in Krueger’s “Varieties of Extended Emotions” (2014d), Jan Slaby’s “Emotions and the
Extended Mind” (2014), and Giovanna Colombetti and Tom Roberts’s “Extending the
Extended Mind: the Case for Extended Affectivity” (2015). Taking seriously the experience
of augmenting and extending our embodiment and cognitive capacities in various ways—
that is, how it feels to be an extended mind from the first-person perspective—is now an
important feature of these new directions in ExM literature.
EXTENDED RELIGIOUS COGNITION
Until now, there have been few attempts to apply ExM to religious cognition. In what
follows, I pursue this idea by looking at how ExM can illuminate the various ways that
religious cognition and experience are scaffolded by the ongoing contribution of external
resources, including the wide array of structures and artifacts that make up religious material
culture. I first consider extended religious cognition. I then turn to extended religious
emotions. I look at some ways we use the world and things in it to think the unthinkable,
focusing on the domain of religious cognition.
USING THE WORLD TO THINK THE UNTHINKABLE
To see how ExM intersects with religious cognition and material culture, we can begin by
investigating another concrete example of materially scaffolded cognition. Note first that the
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kinds of brains we have are good at some things (e.g., pattern recognition and completion)
but not so good at others (e.g., logical or sequential reasoning). Nevertheless, we’re still able
to do the sort of reasoning we find so cognitively demanding. How so? We do so by
recruiting features of the world to stand in as external material representations that amplify
our cognitive abilities and open up new modes of thought and behavior (for a discussion of
these ideas that predates the extended mind thesis, see David Rumelhart et al.’s “Schemata
and Sequential Thought Processes in PDP Models” [1986]).
Consider multiplying two three-digit numbers. One way to solve this problem is to do
it entirely in our head. From an orthodox computationalist perspective, we might think of
the process this way: first, we see the symbols (487  721) on the page; next, we convert
these symbols into internal representations and run various operations over them (i.e., we
manipulate them according to the relevant mathematical rules); finally, these representations
generate behavioral output in the form of writing down an answer (351,127). Voila! We’ve
computed this problem purely by relying on internal resources.
A problem with this story is that it fails to capture how we actually solve problems like
this in the real world. More precisely, it overlooks the central causal contribution our
material environment makes in driving this process along and scaffolding our access to
previously inaccessible forms of mathematical reasoning. Few of us can do this problem in
our heads. Instead, we bring bits of our material culture into the cognitive loop by off-
loading some of the process onto ready-made tools designed to help, such as the charmingly
old-fashioned pencil and paper. Crucially, we manipulate these tools by allowing them to
materially represent steps of the problem that otherwise would be attempted internally: for
instance, we might use a long multiplication method by writing down the numbers in
columns, working through the various procedures thereafter and, as we go along, jotting
down intermediate products until we reach a final answer.
The important point here is that this off-loading process transforms what would
otherwise be a difficult internal representational process (again, something we’re not
good at) into a tool-incorporating perceptuo-motor process (something we are good at)
spread out across brain, body, and world. Like Otto’s notebook, a pencil and paper
potentially opens up new modes of thinking. Accordingly, these thought-enabling tools
deserve equal cognitive credit alongside our internal bio-resources. Cases like these,
ExM defenders argue, vividly show us how parts of our material culture “may be so
integral to our cognitive routines as to count as part of the cognitive machinery itself”
(Clark 2008b, 15).
RELIGIOUS TOOLS SHAPE THE RELIGIOUS MIND
So how does this relate to religious cognition? We can readily imagine analogous cases in the
context of religious faith. Even the most devout believer probably can’t remember each and
every doctrine, practice, or teaching constitutive of their respective tradition. Luckily for
them, they don’t have to. One of the primary functions of religious texts—along with the
different rituals and forms of worship constructed with them—is, precisely, to take over part
of the remembering process for the believer. Like Otto’s notebook-bound belief that MoMA
is on 53rd Street, so, too, are some of the faithful’s dispositional beliefs housed in frequently
consulted devotional texts. As Colombetti and Roberts (2015) note, many people carry
analogue (printed) or digital (in tablets or smartphones) versions of these texts constantly,
making them accessible on a moment’s notice. From the perspective of ExM, relying on
these texts—as well as manipulating other objects such as a Catholic rosary or Hindu Japa
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Mala prayer beads—ought to count as a part of the physical process constituting the
individual’s faithful disposition or religious sentiment.
Drawing on ExM, as well as work by cognitive archaeologists and cognitive
anthropologists—for example, Stephen Mithen’s “The Supernatural Beings of Prehistory
and the External Storage of Religious Ideas” (1998); Merlin Donald’s Origins of the
Modern Mind (1991); and Edwin Hutchins’s Cognition in the Wild (1995)—Matthew
Day makes a similar argument in “Religion, Off-Line Cognition and the Extended Mind”
(2004). He tells us that from the perspective of ExM, “The broad spectrum of rituals,
music, relics, scriptures, statues and buildings typically associated with religious traditions
are no longer seen as mere ethnographic icing on the computational cake. Rather than
thin cultural ‘wrap arounds’ that dress-up the real cognitive processes going on
underneath, they begin to look like central components of the relevant machinery of
religious thought” (Day 2004, 116).
Although many examples in ExM focus on the role that artifacts play in scaffolding
online cognition (i.e., time-pressured here-and-now tasks that unfold in response to
changing environments), Day argues that religious material culture also transforms and
augments offline cognition. Offline cognition is thinking decoupled from the immediate
demands of the environment: our ability to reflect on the past, for instance, make plans for
the future, or speculate about what might have been if circumstances had been different.
Offline religious cognition may involve processes like reflecting on God’s divine nature,
determining how best to interpret a particular text, or thinking through the significance of
particular ethical commands.
Day is especially interested in the deep role that material culture plays in allowing us to
think about divine beings and transcendent realities whose natures and abilities are largely
beyond the scope of logical thought and experience. Once more, the notion of artifacts
serving as external material representations becomes important. Day notes that engaging
with unthinkable deities and realities in religious worship or imagination, for example,
presents a cognitive dilemma. On the one hand, despite their supernatural nature, the
actions, decisions, and motivations of these deities are surprisingly intelligible. This is
because they generally conform to our folk psychological expectations about non-
supernatural agents. The God of Abrahamic traditions, for instance, or the many gods
and goddesses of Hinduism possess beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to Robert N.
McCauley and E. Thomas Lawson in Bringing Ritual to Mind (2002), they act for reasons;
harbor memories; experience emotions like love, anger, and jealousy; and often are
responsive to our attempts to communicate with them. Yet, on the other hand, they also
possess properties and abilities we can barely even imagine: they exist outside of space and
time but still causally intervene in human affairs; the God of Jews, Christians, and Muslims
knows everything, is everywhere at once, and is composed of nonphysical stuff—or a
mysterious mixture of both human and divine reality (e.g., Jesus). As Pascal Boyer writes,
our religious concepts in this way simultaneously preserve and violate our ontological
expectations about the world (Boyer 1994).
So how do religious relics, images, statues, songs, paintings, and even the architecture of
worship spaces help us think the unthinkable? By serving as tangible and persistent material
representations of divine beings and realities, they ensure that “on-line cognition, safely
coupled to anchoring real-world structures, can reach out toward the realm of the invisible,
the untouchable, the barely conceivable” (Clark 2010, 24). Like the process of off-loading
some of our mathematical computations onto pencil and paper—and thus transforming an
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offline in-the-head process into an online perceptuo-motor activity—religious artifacts play
a similar thought-transforming role. And this is precisely what we need them to do.
For although we’re quite good at inventing nearly unimaginable supernatural beings—
the immense number of deities in religious traditions around the globe testifies to this
talent—Mithen (1998) notes we’re not so good at understanding, remembering, or
transmitting specific religious ideas and beliefs about those beings. But this is where we once
again quite literally bring material culture into the cognitive loop. By presenting tangible
features that can be touched, handled, and manipulated in real time, the various forms of
cognitive scaffolding that make up religious material culture are designed specifically to help
users substitute difficult offline problems that arise from thinking and talking about invisible
supernatural agents with counterintuitive natures for more accessible online cognitive tasks
they’re much better at: things, says Day (2004), like recognizing patterns, modeling simple
worldly dynamics, and manipulating objects. These online engagements with material
artifacts allow agents to quite literally get a better grip on the paradoxical nature of
supernatural beings that are part of their belief system.
This idea gains force when we consider its application in nonreligious contexts. We
regularly use material artifacts (sketches, prototypes, models, storyboards, computer
simulations, and the like) to construct “surrogate situations” (Clark 2010, 24): stable,
configurable representations of some future event or as-yet-nonexistent state of affairs.
When planning a bridge, for example, we might take the process offline by internally
imagining a range of things like potential designs, construction details, and phases of the
construction process. But this would be a high cost, low-return strategy. A better strategy—
one that people actually use—is to let the world do some of our thinking and representing:
for example, by using a dotted line or small stick to indicate on a blueprint, drawing, or
sketch the proposed location of a strut. In this way, surrogate situations like models or
prototypes allow planners to extend their cognitive reach into the future; they engage with
as-yet-unrealized possibilities by manipulating tangible here-and-now representations in
material formats. A resource-intensive process (i.e., in-the-head simulation) is fluidly
transformed into a more manageable perception-action task utilizing external resources that
are publically available, ripe for real-time collaboration with others.
Given the ubiquity of these practices in everyday life, it shouldn’t be a surprise to find
them in the context of religious cognition. And if something like this story is true, it suggests
a need to rethink the distinction between religious thought (i.e., the concepts, metaphors,
and arguments normally thought to be the realm of theologians and philosophers) and
religious material culture (i.e., the artifacts, practices, and spaces normally thought to be the
realm of archaeologists, anthropologists, and historians) (see Lambros Malafouris’s How
Things Shape the Mind [2013] for a similar argument that goes beyond religious cognition
and material culture). By looking at the latter, we actually discover new modes and
materializations of the former.
EXTENDED RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS
Although emotions received little attention in early discussions of ExM, they’ve now
assumed an increasingly prominent role in current debates—for example, see J. Adam
Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and S. Orestis Palermos’s “Extended Emotion” (2016);
Colombetti and Roberts’s “Extending the Extended Mind: the Case for Extended
Chapter 15: Extended Mind and Religious Cognition
244 MACMILLAN INTERDISCIPLINARY HANDBOOKS
COPYRIGHT 2017 Macmillan Reference USA, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210
Affectivity” (2015); Krueger’s “Emotions and the Social Niche” (2014b) and “Varieties of
Extended Emotions” (2014d); Slaby’s “Emotions and the Extended Mind” (2014); and
Achim Stephan, Sven Walter, and Wendy Wilutzky’s “Emotions beyond Brain and Body”
(2014). As Chalmers notes in his foreword to Clark’s 2008 book, Supersizing the Mind, the
idea is that “perhaps one might have something akin to an extended mood, if not an
extended emotion, when one’s environment is always nudging one toward happiness or
sadness” (Clark 2008a, xiv). As we’ll see in more detail, there does appear to be a tight link
between the way we use material culture to organize and manipulate different spaces (home,
work, and so on), and the sort of moods and emotions we routinely feel when we inhabit
and negotiate these spaces (for further discussion of these ideas, see Colombetti and
Krueger’s “Scaffoldings of the Affective Mind” [2015] and Krueger’s “Musicing,
Materiality, and the Emotional Niche” [2015]). Moreover, moods and emotions, such as
awe, wonder, joy, love, despair, gratitude, contrition, guilt, and compassion, seem to be a
central part of religious experience. As the cases discussed next make clear, very often the
material context in which we enact our religious practices, and the tools we use to enact
them, are designed specifically to scaffold the emergence and ongoing development of these
feelings.
MUSICALLY SCAFFOLDED EMOTIONS
To bring this idea into sharper relief, consider the role that music—a prominent part of
most religious practices—plays in eliciting and organizing our emotions (for a more detailed
discussion of ExM and music cognition, see Krueger’s “Affordances and the Musically
Extended Mind” [2014a], “Musical Manipulations and the Emotionally Extended Mind”
[2014c], and “Musicing, Materiality, and the Emotional Niche” [2015], as well as
Cochrane’s “Expression and Extended Cognition” [2008], and Luke Kersten’s “Music and
Cognitive Extension” [2014]). Ethnomusicologists generally assume that all cultures have
music and use it to regulate emotions and behavior and to intensify social bonds. At the
neural level, music perception and emotional experience appear to be integrated processes.
Neuroimaging studies suggest that our musical responses involve many regions of the
brain—prefrontal cortex, motor cortex, somatosensory cortex, temporal lobes, parietal
cortex, occipital cortex, cerebellum, and limbic regions (composed of the amygdala and
thalamus)—including those involved in generating, detecting, maintaining, and regulating
emotions (see, for example, “Emotional Responses to Pleasant and Unpleasant Music
Correlate with Activity in Paralimbic Brain Regions” [1999] by Anne J. Blood et al.; “Brain
Correlates of Music-Evoked Emotions” [2014] by Stefan Koelsch; and “Being Together in
Time: Musical Experience and the Mirror Neuron System” (2009) by Katie Overy and
Istvan Molnar-Szakacs).
To understand why music is such a powerful tool for scaffolding emotions, consider
what we might refer to as the world-making power of music. We don’t hear music as mere
noise. Rather, we hear it as meaningful. We encounter music as an experientially rich
environment affording different modes of listening and bodily engagement, from nodding
or tapping our fingers to full-blown episodes of ecstatic dancing (see Eric Clarke’s Ways of
Listening [2005] and Krueger’s “Enacting Musical Experience” [2009] and “Doing Things
with Music” [2011a] for more on this idea). In other words, music is perceptually
encountered as an external resource, as a tool we can do things with: it creates an
environment we can attentively explore and manipulate as we actively use music to guide
and shape our musically driven emotions and behavior. As Tia DeNora argues in Music in
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Everyday Life (2000), this becomes apparent by looking at the various ways we actively use
music in everyday life, including in religious contexts.
For example, we deliberately play specific kinds of music at specific times and in specific
places; in so doing, we use music to manage the organizational dynamics of different spaces.
And this musical management has emotional consequences. Compare playing classical
music at a low volume in the background of a formal dinner party versus suddenly blasting
pop music from speakers in the next room. In the former case, the music provides
unobtrusive background color, gently nudging guests toward certain patterns of situationally
appropriate emotional experience and behavior (speaking calmly, remaining in one’s seat,
observing rules of formal dinner etiquette). In the latter case, the loud pop music abruptly
reconfigures the space of that same environment by introducing novel sonic elements as well
as, importantly, novel action possibilities. Guests might now get up, move to the next room,
and start dancing, laughing, and talking loudly. Because the musical structure of that space
has changed, these new actions—along with new emotional responses and performances—
are not only felt as possible but also as appropriate.
In a religious context, music plays a similar function. Slower reverent music—at a
funeral, for instance—establishes a tranquil space gently nudging guests toward reflection,
grief, and introspective remembrance. But not all funerals are somber affairs, and their
musical character reflects this variation. Within the Southern Baptist tradition in the United
States, for example, African American funerals may begin with mournful singing and prayer
but soon transition into joyful affairs—complete with dancing, shouting, and exuberant up-
tempo praise hymns—that celebrate the deceased’s eternal reunion with Christ. Music is a
central part of this process, scaffolding the participants’ moods and emotions and
dynamically organizing their behavior as they pass through various phases of this collective
experience. In this way, music is routinely used in religious and nonreligious contexts alike
as a tool to manipulate our emotions and behavior by manipulating the practical and
normative spaces of different environments.
Moreover, because musical engagements are richly cross-modal and whole-body
experiences—affecting listeners in an ongoing way at neurophysiological, behavioral, and
experiential levels—music can be thought of as a persistent environmental source of
emotion-specific bioregulatory feedback. Put otherwise, when we listen to music, it
becomes part of a self-stimulating feedback loop (like Otto’s notebook) that drives,
structures, and regulates the character and development of various embodied processes
responsible for emotion, action, and experience. By stimulating and directly modulating
these particular neural and physiological responses, music functions as a real-time emotion
regulator: it coaxes emotions out of us and actively shapes their dynamics as they unfold in
real time—see, for example, Petr Janata, Stefan T. Tomic, and Jason M. Haberman’s
“Sensorimotor Coupling in Music and the Psychology of the Groove” (2012); Maria A.
G. Witek et al.’s “Syncopation, Body-Movement and Pleasure in Groove Music” (2014);
and W. Luke Windsor and Christophe de Bézenac’s “Music and Affordances” (2012). So,
when we play music or enter into a preestablished, musically structured soundworld—
such as those we find in a church, mosque, or temple—by temporarily inhabiting this
soundworld, we let music take over some of the emotion-specific bioregulatory work. In
taking over this regulatory role, music functions much the way that input from a skilled
dance partner extends, transforms, and—in an important sense—completes the shape of
our own dancing responses. In short, music becomes an active partner in helping us to
construct and regulate our emotional experiences. Without the ongoing input of the
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music, much like Otto and his notebook, we wouldn’t be able to access these musically
scaffolded emotions.
MUSICAL ACTIONS, MUSICAL MEMORIES
Music can exert a powerful cognitive impact in other ways, too. For example, music
scaffolds processes of social bonding by synchronizing the moods and emotions of a large
number of people (via the processes just discussed), which can promote the large-scale
synchronization of joint action and behavior. This is a central ritualistic function of music.
Rituals are patterns of organized behavior that follow a prescribed form or order. They can
unfold at multiple time-scales, from moments to several years or a lifetime, and can involve
few people (e.g., two people kneeling to chant, pray, or sing a hymn) or many (e.g., an
entire nation observing a predetermined moment of silence). Within a ritualistic context,
music often plays a central role in driving and organizing the different practices and
behaviors that compose it.
For example, musical qualities, such as rhythm, melody, and pulse (i.e., periodic
accents repeated at regular intervals), order the temporal structure of a religious event. These
musical structures facilitate organized movements and behavioral coordination between
participants by providing environmental cues enabling groups of individuals to move and
act in time, as one. Think of the way that musical intervals order nearly every aspect of a
formal worship service in the Anglican or Lutheran traditions of Christianity. In these
traditions, musical cues (generally organ or choral music) signal when to sit, stand, kneel,
pray, or greet one’s fellow worshippers; they also signal the start of the gospel reading, tell
participants when to approach the front of the church for communion, and even determine
what sort of actions are appropriate during a particular phase of the service (e.g., slow,
thoughtful music when filing back to one’s seat after communion versus buoyant end-of-
service music signaling the freedom to get up and mingle).
In this way, musical structures can encode particular instructions or action scripts
constitutive of a given ritual. Instead of participants having to remember each and every
movement or sequence of actions, they can off-load this cognitive responsibility onto the
music and let it take over and govern their behavior. Musical structures thus materialize
time; they are external representations that tell participants when and how to act. As Gilbert
Rouget observes in Music and Trance (1985), we might of think of music this way as a kind
of sonic architecture that gives time a material reality it doesn’t normally seem to have;
music indicates that things are happening right here, right now—and that certain rule-
governed actions are now appropriate relative to the demands of the music.
But music doesn’t only guide action. It also encodes ritualistic practices and action
scripts and, in so doing, preserves their memory over many generations. Canonical musical
practices are thus intergenerational scaffolding. Songs, hymns, chants, and sung prayers
continually remind worshippers of their religious duties and action and, as we’ve seen, they
elicit and regulate the appropriate mood or emotional response. They also are the vehicle for
both communicating and preserving the stories, myths, legends, beliefs, and practices of a
religious tradition across multiple generations. As Wanda T. Wallace explains in “Memory
for Music: Effect of Melody on Recall of Text” (1994), rhythms and melodies chunk words
and phrases, identify line lengths and stress patterns, and help listeners focus on important
words of a text. Music augments memory by scaffolding processes of learning, retrieving,
remembering, and reconstructing texts, including religious texts encoding the beliefs and
practices of their respective traditions.
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MUSIC AND RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION
To return to Mithen’s observation in “The Supernatural Beings of Prehistory and the
External Storage of Religious Ideas” (1998), religious music can play yet another cognitive
role. Like relics, statues, and paintings, musical pieces—as well as the instruments used to
make and listen to music—can serve as cognitive anchors that enable believers to better get a
grip on elusive properties of certain religious teachings while simultaneously arousing an
emotion-laden sense of wonder and transcendence.
Consider the shakuhachi, the Japanese flute often used to supplement Zen meditation.
According to Ian W. Mabbett in “Buddhism and Music” (1993), this flute plays a dual
cognitive role. On one hand, its material structure is meant to mirror the harmonized
structure of mind and universe: the straight upper part of the flute, fashioned from the
bamboo stem, symbolizes clarity, light, and the heavens (yang), whereas the rough unformed
bottom, cut from the underground bamboo root, symbolizes mystery, formlessness, and the
darkness from which everything emerges and to which it eventually returns (yin). The
concept of yin-yang is normally associated with various Chinese schools of philosophy, such
as Daoism. But Daoism, particularly the version developed by Zhuangzi, was influential in
shaping the reception and development of Buddhism in China, including Chan (Japanese,
Zen) Buddhism. As Mabbett notes, “There is a great deal of Taoism in the Zen spirit”
(1993, 19). This structure provides a tangible representation of the mutually sustaining
interplay of these two psycho-cosmological principles. Additionally, the breathy, ethereal
sounds produced by the flute—which gently swell and recede and are characterized by their
soothing yet slightly raspy or unformed quality—summon a felt sense of impermanence and
change, an experiential encounter with the dynamic intermingling of being and nothingness
at the heart of Zen Buddhist cosmology.
Both structurally and sonically, the flute represents properties of mind and universe
that, from a purely conceptual standpoint, otherwise might seem contradictory or beyond
the scope of our thinking. By embodying these teachings in material and sonic form, the
shakuhachi becomes a perceptual prosthesis for (quite literally) gripping these teachings in an
immediate visceral way. The sorts of cases discussed in this section affirm anthropologist
Clifford Geertz’s (1926–2006) observation that musical spaces, and the artifacts that
comprise them, provide the imaginative context in which “the lived-in order merges with
the dreamed-of order” (quoted in Small 1998, 98).
OTHER EMOTIONAL SPACES, PLACES, AND ARTIFACTS
Music may be the most powerful artifact we have for scaffolding our emotions. But other
parts of religious material culture play a similar role. Consider weddings. Wedding
ceremonies are an important part of nearly every culture; for many, they are also deeply
imbued with religious significance. Most of us grow up attending many weddings, and we
quickly learn that they are meaningful events. The intense emotions experienced and
expressed at weddings reflect this significance.
But these emotions are not simply feelings participants bring to the wedding. The
material dimensions of the wedding context play an ongoing role in scaffolding the real-time
performance and experience of emotions. The wedding context is full of artifacts
purposefully designed to facilitate the appropriate feelings: special music and singing; codes
of dress and behavior; ritualized aspects of the ceremony and celebration; and features of the
setting, such as decorations, food, and the building or location itself (e.g., a church, temple,
or specific natural locale). The deliberate organization and structure of these material factors
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helps participants cultivate the appropriate emotions at the right time. For example, as Brian
Parkinson, Agneta H. Fischer, and Antony S. R. Manstead write in Emotions in Social
Relations (2005), the particular setting of the church—with its ornate yet somber
decorations, rich organ music, particular sequencing of actions and ceremonial phases, and
conventional responses from the congregants—is composed of interconnected material
elements that collectively elicit and regulate participants’ emotional responses at an implicit
level.
These material factors guide participants’ attention and regulate their emotional
experiences and expressions in real time. But they also encode what Hazel Markus and
Shinobu Kitayama writing in “The Cultural Construction of Self and Emotion:
Implications for Social Behavior” (1994) call ideational factors, too. The paintings, statues,
music, songs, food, clothing, and architecture—as well as the practices surrounding these
items—will vary greatly, depending on the beliefs and teachings of the particular religious
tradition of which they are a part. For example, contrast the material setting of a wedding in
a Catholic church, say, versus a Hindu or a secular wedding ceremony. Accordingly, these
items not only scaffold emotional experiences but also embody distinct values, norms, and
practices governing distinct emotion scripts and display rules—in other words, ideational
factors determine how these context-specific emotions are expressed.
Other examples abound. A Catholic confessional, for example, is a clear representation
of how ideational and material factors interpenetrate in religious cultural artifacts. The
confessional (a small enclosed booth used for the Sacrament of Penance) is an emotional
artifact whose structure is designed specifically to place practical constraints on emotional
conduct and experience. Its structure minimizes distraction and embarrassment by blocking
out the external world; and it encourages openness and trust by creating an intimate space
between priest and parishioner (separated by a grid or lattice) in which sins can be freely
confessed. In this sense, the confession booth functions as an emotion-regulating bit of
technology that simultaneously embodies and sustains values and practices (i.e., ideational
factors) central to the Catholic faith.
According to Colombetti and Krueger (2015), even the more general architectural and
interior design spaces of churches, temples, and mosques can be manipulated to scaffold
emotional responses and embody ideational factors. These spaces often are designed
explicitly to evoke a variety of feelings—faith, hope, awe, love, compassion, and guilt—
supported by various artifacts, practices, and arrangements. This can be seen in the way that
some contemporary churches have reconfigured the layout of their worship space in
response to the evolving emotional needs and desires of modern parishioners.
For example, in the early 1960s, the Roman Catholic Church changed the spatial
arrangement of the Eucharist. Traditionally, the priest would stand at the altar, facing away
from the congregation as he led them through the sacrament. But contemporary
worshippers desired a more interpersonal experience. Following the change, the priest
moved behind the altar but faced the congregation in a more accessible dialogical stance. In
How to Read a Church (2004), Richard Taylor explains that other material manipulations—
such as the way the altar has, in some churches, migrated from a distant and elevated area of
the chancel to the middle of the nave at the same level of the congregation, where it is often
surrounded on all sides by pews—similarly reflect changing values and emotional needs.
These new arrangements speak to the desire for a more direct emotional connection with
the priest and God. These arrangements also affect the worship experience by strengthening
the sense of sharing in a collective experience and forming a unified body of believers.
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Similar processes are reflected in the design of other contemporary Christian worship
spaces, many of which eschew traditional arrangements, icons, and liturgies. Instead, the
interior spaces of these contemporary churches are much more casual than their traditional
counterparts. Some look like the inside of a theater or entertainment venue. Instead of
wooden pews and a pulpit, one finds comfortable chairs and elaborate stages with advanced
audiovisual technologies. Services are celebrated with rock music, light shows, and videos—
and worshippers are encouraged to stand, sing, and energetically participate. Again, these
contemporary forms of worship have arisen in response to the changing values and
emotional needs of modern audiences.
EXTENDED MIND, EXTENDED SELF?
Finally, we briefly consider how ExM may affect considerations of selfhood and personal
identity, traditionally central themes in religious literature. Thus far, discussions of ExM
have had relatively little to say about implications of the view for thinking about the self (but
see Michele Merrit’s 2013 article “Instituting Impairment: Extended Cognition and the
Construction of Female Sexual Dysfunction” for a rich discussion of ExM, gender, and
identity). This is somewhat surprising. As Wilson observes in “Meaning Making and the
Mind of the Externalist” (2010), many of the arguments for ExM—including Clark and
Chalmers’s original Otto case—are cyborg fantasy arguments. As we’ve already seen, they
involve cases in which an individual’s cognitive performance is so deeply scaffolded by some
external technology that (so it is argued) no principled reason exists for claiming the
technology isn’t a proper part of the individual’s cognitive system. Although his notebook is
decidedly old-school technology, Otto is nevertheless still a cyborg—a posthuman, biotech
blending of animal and machine.
Although few theorists working on ExM have tackled this topic directly, the question of
how ExM might affect thinking about the self has been present from the start. At the end of
their article, Clark and Chalmers ask (and then answer) the following question:
What, finally, of the self? Does the extended mind imply an extended self? It would
seem so. Most of us already accept that the self outstrips the boundaries of
consciousness; my dispositional beliefs, for example, constitute in some deep sense
part of who I am. If so, then these boundaries may also fall beyond the skin. The
information in Otto’s notebook, for example, is a central part of his identity as a
cognitive agent. What this comes to is that Otto himself is best regarded as an
extended system, a coupling of biological organism and external resources. To
consistently resist this conclusion, we would have to shrink the self into a mere
bundle of occurrent states, severely threatening its deep psychological continuity. Far
better to take the broader view, and see agents themselves as spread into the world
[emphasis added]. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, 18)
Elsewhere, Clark affirms this picture of the extended self. He tells us that if we accept
something like the model of mind ExM gives us, there is no self—if, that is, by self we mean
some cognitive essence that constitutes the unchanging core of who and what we are.
Rather, ExM offers a much more fluid, dynamic, and changeable picture of the self—what
Clark terms a “soft self” made up of a “a rough-and-tumble control-sharing coalition of
processes—some neural, some bodily, some technological—and an ongoing drive to tell a
story, to paint a picture in which I am the central player” (Clark 2007, 114).
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It thus would appear that if we accept ExM, we should be inclined to accept a similar
picture of the self as spread out into the world, partially constituted by the environmental
resources that scaffold its thinking, experience, and action. But not everyone accepts this
conclusion. In “Persons and the Extended Mind Thesis” (2009), for example, Lynne
Rudder Baker characterizes herself as a “traditional externalist” (646), which means that she
takes social, linguistic, and physical environments to play essential roles in determining our
cognitive and behavioral capacities. Yet she resists the extended picture of the self Clark
thinks flows naturally from ExM. Instead, Rudder Baker argues that although some
cognitive processes may loop out into the world and encompass both organic and non-
organic parts—for example, extended memories composed of brain states plus notebook—
these processes still require an entity doing the processing: an agent or conscious subject of
experience. In other words, these cognitive processes aren’t just free-floating phenomena.
They need an owner. And that owner, Rudder Baker further argues, is constituted by her
organic body; she spatially coincides with her body and thus does not extend beyond it. In
this sense, then, Rudder Baker thinks (contra Clark) that there is something relatively fixed
about the self. Selves—conceived of as unified first-person perspectives—spatially coincide
with their bodies, even if some of the physical processes responsible for their mental states
simultaneously extended into the world.
In “The Metaphysics of the Extended Mind in Ontological Entanglements” (2011),
Anna Marmodoro argues for ExM’s theological significance in the context of divine
selfhood. She applies ExM to Christian metaphysics, particularly the relation between the
divine nature of the Trinity (God the Father, God the Son, and the Holy Spirit) and the
identity of Jesus, incarnate in human form. According to orthodox Christianity, Jesus is
simultaneously constituted by both immaterial (as God the Son) and material (as a human
being) substances. The central metaphysical mystery of the incarnation is to clarify how we
might conceive of this relation—that is, how Jesus, as both God and man, might
constitutionally partake of the material world. Marmodoro argues that ExM can help shed
light on this mystery. Specifically, she argues that we might think of the divine mind (God
the Son) extending into an external resource (Jesus) to carry out some of its mental activities
within the order of creation. God the Son and Jesus are ontologically entangled, much the
way that Otto and his notebook are ontologically entangled when they come together to
form an environmentally extended cognitive system. Likewise, God the Son, according to
Marmodoro, is “extensively empowered by Jesus within the human social reality” (2011,
223), in that Jesus—in human form—serves as the vehicle for his causal interventions in the
natural order. Yet, just as Otto is never wholly reducible to his notebook (and vice versa)
while cognitively extended by it, God the Son and Jesus similarly retain their distinct
identities, despite this ontological entanglement.
Summary
This chapter has indicated a number of ways that ExM might productively inform religious
studies, particularly considerations of religious cognition and material culture. Until now,
there have been relatively few attempts to bring ExM into conversation with religious
studies. This should change. As should now be clear, ExM offers fruitful resources for
illuminating the many ways religious thought and experience are deeply scaffolded by the
practices and material contexts in which they occur.
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If ExM is on the right track, many of the tools we use to organize and enact religious
thoughts and feelings are not mere prompts or supplements distinct from those religious
thoughts and feelings. Rather, they are proper parts of those thoughts and feelings
themselves. The very way we are able to think about the nature of divine beings, for
instance—such as trying to understand how they can simultaneously have both natural
and supernatural properties—may depend on our engagements with the material
representations of these beings we routinely look at, touch, and handle as part of our
everyday religious practices. Similarly, the array of emotions that regularly arise within
religious contexts may be driven, organized and scaffolded by the different musical
practices that are a central part of these contexts. As we’ve seen, religious music—along
with other artifacts such as texts, icons, and rituals—may even play a central role
in scaffolding religious memory, including processes of learning, retrieving, and acting
out the many beliefs and practices distinctive of a particular tradition. Finally,
ExM potentially contributes important theoretical resources for thinking through the
nature of religious selfhood and personal identity, both at the human level as well as the
divine.
One of the enduring lessons from this engagement between ExM and religious
cognition, then, is that although religious cognition may routinely traffic with the
otherworldly and the transcendent, ExM reminds us that we also are decidedly embodied
and immanent beings. This immanence is reflected in the ways we make and use an
impressive array of tools for thinking. But from the perspective of ExM, these things also
shape us—perhaps every bit as much as we shape them.
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